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Inclusive Development and Climate Change: The Geopolitics 
of Fossil Fuel Risks in Developing Countries 
Joyeeta Gupta1 and Eric Chu2 
 
Abstract: This conceptual paper brings together two previously disparate strands of 
scholarship on climate change and development together with emerging studies of 
stranded assets. It addresses the question: What are the lessons learnt from this literature 
for the way developing countries should ‘develop’ in a post-Paris Agreement world? The 
paper argues that instead of a blind neo-colonial process of rapidly replicating the devel-
opment paths of already industrialized countries – especially in the context of the fossil 
fuel sector – developing countries must adopt their own unique development strategies 
that are more inclusive and transformative. The foregone economic gains from not in-
vesting in fossil fuels maybe compensated by the reduced risks of stranded assets and 
climate change impacts in the future – as well as the reduced risks of climate change im-
pacts on, for example, the agricultural sector – which may facilitate their own unique 
paths toward inclusive development.     
 
Key words: stranded assets, inclusive development, wellbeing, climate change, Paris 
Agreement 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Since World War II, international development scholars and national policymakers have 
debated about the question of what is development and how to develop (Meier & Stiglitz 
2001; Thorbecke 2006; Easterly 2007; Gupta & Thompson 2006). Since the 1980s, the 
debate was broadened to include environmental issues, which was subsequently re-
framed as sustainable development (World Commission on Environment and 
Development 1987). Since the 2000s, scholars increasingly discussed how human civili-
zation is now entering the Anthropocene, and that the need to address ecological issues 
has become more urgent (Steffen et al. 2011; Crutzen 2006; Lewis & Maslin 2015). In 
this context, in 2015, the member states of the United Nations adopted the Paris Agree-
ment on Climate Change (Paris Agreement 2015), where they committed to ensure that 
global average temperature would not rise beyond 1.5-2 degrees Celsius in relation to 
pre-industrial levels. This Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016 and applies 
to the period beyond 2020. Countries have also promised to commit to reducing their 
(rate of) growth of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and – implicitly – to eventually 
phase out all emissions (Gupta 2016). At the same time, growing global inequality led to 
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the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000, and in 2015, the same 
member states adopted 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that aim to tackle so-
cio-ecological challenges, including climate change, by 2030.    
The above political commitments have taken place against two theoretical traditions: one 
in relation to development and climate change in which different disciplines have ad-
dressed their various challenges within the context of developing and industrialized 
countries. A second strand, within a more narrow scholarship, examines obsolete tech-
nologies, stranded assets, and stranded resources within the field of technology, health, 
and economy, expanding in recent years to include stranded resources. These theories 
approach the question of development from different angles – the first more positively 
looking at what needs to be done and emphasizes opportunities; the second more nega-
tively learning from economic and other losses resulting from development processes 
and choices and, simultaneously, emphasizes risks.  
Before moving ahead, we would like to note that the term ‘developing countries’ refers 
broadly to the 150 countries of the Global South. These countries are not homogenous; 
however, most of them have a shared history of colonization, have a relatively low or 
lower income per capita than in industrialized countries, and are mostly outside the club 
of the OECD countries. Having said that, some of these countries are rapidly developing 
countries – also referred to as emerging economies – such as China, while some are 
middle income countries and some are less developed countries. In this paper, we focus 
on the middle income countries and emerging economies.  
Since some countries have become rich from their fossil fuel resources (e.g. Norway and 
OPEC countries) and others link dependence on fossil fuels with energy insecurity at the 
national level, developing countries are adopting different strategies to gain access to 
fossil fuels (Amineh & Yang 2012). At the same time, scholars warn that obsolete tech-
nologies leave countries and industries with stranded resources and assets (Uibeleisen 
2011). Against this background, this conceptual paper addresses the question: What are 
the lessons learnt for the way developing countries should ‘develop’ in a post-Paris 
Agreement world, especially in relation to current and future fossil fuel investments 
within the context of their larger development trajectory? In doing so, we combine the 
theories of development (see 2) and stranded assets (see 3) through an inclusive devel-
opment lens (see 2.3 and 4), before drawing some conclusions (see 5). 
To illustrate these dynamics, we assess the experiences of three countries – the rapidly 
emerging economy of China, the middle income country of Nigeria, and the least devel-
oped country of Kenya, who recently graduated to the status of a middle income country 
and will have to work hard to keep that status. Each of these countries represent different 
stages of development and also face different fossil fuel dilemmas. For China, it is how 
to enhance the country’s development while staying within its legally binding commit-
ments made under the Paris Agreement. This is further complicated as China has em-
barked on a global oil and gas purchase and investment spree (Amineh & Yang 2012) 
and is heavily investing in coal fields at home, while also being a global leader in wind 
and solar energy (Gupta & Wong 2014). For Nigeria, oil has been key to its foreign ex-
change revenues and its national income for decades, but has not substantively enhanced 
the wellbeing of its people or increased their access to energy, while local to global pol-
lution has increased and has been condemned by courts (Nwajiaku-Dahou 2012; Ite 
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2007). For Kenya, newly discovered oil and gas reserves has raised hopes in the country 
about its prospective wealth; the question is whether it is wise to invest in it (Bos & 
Gupta 2016). Clearly, these three countries will also be exposed to the impacts of climate 
change, and will likely experience impacts on rain dependent agricultural communities 
and in low-lying coastal communities. These three examples showcase the risks and 
trade-offs of pursuing fossil fuel-driven development pathways, and point to lessons for 
more inclusive and transformative development patterns in a post-Paris Agreement 
world. 
 
2. Development, inclusive development, and developing 
countries: Opportunities  
2.1 Introduction  
This section first discusses the theories of development, then introduces inclusive devel-
opment, and elaborates further on what such a theory would imply for the case study 
countries.  
2.2 Theories of development 
Many development scholars and practitioners believe that development is a linear path 
and that developing countries must ‘catch up’ with the industrialized world. Seventy 
years of development and development cooperation literature shows how practically in 
every decade, new prescriptions on what is development and how industrialized coun-
tries should help developing countries develop have been proposed and implemented 
(Meier & Stiglitz 2001; Thorbecke 2006; Easterly 2007; Gupta & Thompson 2006). 
Most of these have aimed at making developing countries follow in the footsteps of the 
industrialized world, though there have also been discussions about how developing 
countries should ‘leap frog ahead’ and skip some stages of development. This is in line 
with the neo-colonial view of development where developed countries also market spe-
cific technologies and capacities to developing countries as a way to build capacity and 
‘develop’ in the image of the North and using Northern discourses (such as through the 
rhetoric of governance, good governance, and neo-liberal capitalism) (So 1990).  
From the developing countries’ perspective, many have felt that while aid provided some 
assistance, subsequent trade, investment, and environmental rules have actually been de-
veloped to prevent their development (Mickelson et al. 2008). This has led them to argue 
in favor of the New International Economic Order and the Right to Development since 
the 1960s (Schrijver & Weiss 2004). The Right to Development was adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly in 1986, and argues that developing countries have 
the right to develop and that this allows them some leeway in their behavior at the inter-
national level (Amador 1990; Chowdhury et al. 1992). Barely six years later, this idea 
was reformulated as the Right to, and duty for, promoting Sustainable Development in 
the Climate Change Convention of 1992, which codified the content of the Right to De-
velopment into a legally binding Convention (Gupta and Arts 2018).   
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However, developing countries feel that they need to first pollute the environment (‘de-
velopment first’) before they are rich enough to afford to maintain the ecosystem ser-
vices of nature. This tends to follow from an inappropriate understanding of the ‘inverted 
U-shaped’ environmental Kuznets curve (Malenbaum 1978; Jänicke et al. 1989; 
Grossman 1995; Selden & Song 1994) – that patterns that were valid for the developed 
countries in the past are necessarily predictive of the behaviors of developing countries 
in the future. In a world without global tipping points, countries could discuss their indi-
vidual futures without taking into account how national trends cumulatively and collec-
tively lead to crossing planetary boundaries (Rockström et al. 2009). But in the context 
of the Anthropocene, this is not a luxury for either developing countries or industrialized 
countries (Crutzen 2006).  
At the same time, the emphasis on marketing neoliberal capitalist approaches globally 
has led to trade-offs in favor of narrowly defined economic growth in financial terms, ra-
ther than actually implementing hard sustainable development that allows no trade-offs 
between social, ecological, and economic priorities (Parris & Kates 2003; United 
Nations 2016). This has led both developed and developing countries to focus on 
‘growth’ first – one can see this in the case of the US’s refusal to agree to legally binding 
emissions targets for the period between 1992 and 2020 as well as the reluctance of Rus-
sia, Canada, New Zealand, and Japan to commit to targets in the 2012-2020 period 
(Gupta 2016). Meanwhile China has adopted the philosophy of the green and circular 
economy as a way to emphasize growth and the environment as its strategy for the future 
(Zhang 2010; Jiang et al. 2010), the question is whether this will end up being green-
wash.  
2.3 Inclusive development 
This history can be contrasted with the Inclusive Development view which suggests that 
both developing and industrialized countries must find unique, country specific, alterna-
tive development strategies towards sustainable development (Pieterse 1998; Friedmann 
1992). Under this view, enhancing development requires not only directly meeting both 
individual and collective social wellbeing, but also investing in the maintenance of the 
ecosystem services of nature on which human wellbeing depends (Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment 2003). If such services are by definition finite, this means that 
any technological approach adopted to achieve development must increasingly stay with-
in ecosystem limits, or else it will come at the cost of development for others. Inclusive 
development questions the continuous linear quest for growth as reflected in increasing 
income for all (Gupta et al. 2015). Continuous growth is only possible by competitively 
turning all natural resources and ecosystem services into commodities and technologies 
with a price, or through a system in which capital begets capital. Instead, inclusive de-
velopment focuses on enhancing human wellbeing and living within ecosystem services, 
thus creating a sustainable society rather than economy. 
 
Figure 1 Inclusive development (ID) variants (ID-1 and ID-2) 
Insert Figure 1 here 
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Figure 1 captures this debate. The first triangle represents sustainable development with 
its three corners showing social, economic, and ecological aspects. The grey triangles 
within it focus on the socio-ecological aspects that are key to inclusive development. The 
first triangle represents the world of the Kyoto Protocol, where countries are unwilling to 
commit to reducing emissions if it compromises their economic growth and competitive-
ness. Here, the concept of inclusive development (ID-1) also gets trapped in current 
dominant thinking about development and where the economy is more dominant in the 
green economy concept. The second triangle represents a shift towards a society in which 
development is seen more as enhancing socio-ecological wellbeing and where ecosystem 
limits dominate in the green economy. This ensures, for example, that ecosystem ser-
vices are available for agricultural and rural sectors. One can argue that  the Paris 
Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals tries to emphasize  individual and 
collective social wellbeing over national GNP or GNP per capita: economic growth is 
mentioned only a handful of times in the entire SDG document (Gupta and Vegelin 
2016).   
In the next sections, we apply an understanding of inclusive development in the context 
of climate change to the case studies of China, Nigeria, and Kenya.  
2.4 The Case of China 
China’s economy has only started to grow in recent decades. In the 1990s, China’s 
income was relatively low. But in 2014, the country’s population grew to more than 1.3 
billion and its GNI was nearly USD 18 trillion. Even though China has high emissions 
today, its cumulative share between 1850 and 2002 was only about 7.6% compared to 
29.3% of the US. Recent emissions have been higher, but any equitable sharing of 
emission responsibilities reduces the need for China to do as much as the US (Baer et al. 
2008; Opschoor 2010; Dellink et al. 2009). However, the sheer size of its emissions 
requires China to address emissions growth and achieve peak emissions soon, or else 
global emission reduction goals cannot be achieved as China is locked into a fossil fuel-
dependent development trajectory.  
Over the past 25 years, China has called on industrialized countries to reduce their GHG 
emissions, and has argued that policy change in developing countries must be dependent 
on international technological and financial assistance from industrialized countries un-
der Article 4.7 of the Climate Change Convention. Furthermore, China has asserted its 
right to (sustainable) development by encouraging the adoption of measures with co-
benefits, such as energy conservation and efficiency (Stensdal 2012; Lewis 2007; 
Richerzhagen & Scholz 2008; Gupta & Wong 2014). This overarching climate change 
policy emerged as China transitioned from a centrally planned economy to a socialist 
market economy 
Though China’s energy policy is centrally overseen by the State Economic and Trade 
Commission, specific actions are executed by different state enterprises. In addition to 
investing in fossil fuels at home and abroad, China also prioritizes renewable energy 
(Jiang et al. 2010) and has committed to a global 1.5-2°C goal by signing the Paris 
Agreement in April 2016. In its Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC), 
China aims to reduce its GHG emissions per unit of GDP by 60-65% by 2030 compared 
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to 2005 levels, and will do so by investing in the demand side of energy through promot-
ing ‘low-carbon lives’ and ‘low-carbon days’ (Gupta 2014). 
 
Despite this, China continues to invest heavily in oil exploration abroad on account of its 
limited domestic sources, and is now the world’s second largest oil consumer and the 
largest oil importer. For example, China has invested in oil and gas fields in Saudi Ara-
bia (Mo 2014) and in Ghana since 2010 with an intent to oil importation. Still, recent 
studies have shown that Chinese oil companies in Ghana often act independently of Chi-
nese state interests and do not contribute to the policy needs of Ghana. In another exam-
ple, China has pursued joint ventures in Sudan that have led to both profits and social in-
vestments in the country. These investments face both local political risks – as exempli-
fied by South Sudan gaining independence in 2012 – as well as global political risks (Mo 
2014).  
When theorized in relation to the right to development and energy security, China and its 
oil companies have a right to access fossil fuel resources for profit. However, since much 
of this revenue is only channelled back to China for short-term development purposes, 
the country is not actually improving its energy security needs. In this case, new pur-
chases and investments in countries such as Ghana and Sudan may eventually result in 
stranded assets and a reduction in long-term returns on investment, as well as simultane-
ously exposing the country to climate change risks and impacts. Finally, continued in-
vestments in fossil fuels may further expose Chinese agriculture and other critical sectors 
to the impacts of climate change. 
2.5 The Case of Nigeria 
Since discovering oil in commercial quantities in 1956, Nigeria has become an oil-
producing nation and joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
in 1971. Currently Nigeria has an estimated 37 billion barrels of proven crude oil re-
serves, which is the second largest in Africa after Libya. The country also has an esti-
mated 180 trillion cubic feet of proven natural gas reserves, making it the largest in Afri-
ca and the ninth largest in the world. Despite this vast resource wealth, oil profits only 
contribute to 14% of Nigeria’s GDP, even though it accounts for 75% of government 
revenues (from taxes on and royalties paid by oil companies) and 95% of export reve-
nues.  
Nigeria has long been touted as a poster child of the ‘resource curse’, which notes that 
nations with vast natural resource wealth actually perform more poorly in economic 
terms when compared to countries with resource deficits (Sachs & Warner 2001). In this 
case, revenues from extracting natural resources displace other export-led drivers of eco-
nomic growth, including trading and manufacturing functions, while also taking away 
investment opportunities in critical social sectors such as education, entrepreneurship, or 
innovation (Sachs & Warner 2001). For example, the contribution of oil revenues as a 
proportion of total government revenue in Nigeria rose from 26.3% in 1970 to 82.1% in 
1974 (Frynas 2001), and this number has continued to increase.  
Others note that revenues from natural resource extraction are also easily appropriated, 
which means that countries can easily fall prey to corruption and a failure to target pro-
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growth policies, resulting in unequal wealth distribution and the creation of ‘predator 
states’. For Nigeria, the high proportion of government revenues attributed to oil and gas 
also negates the need to levy high taxes, thus reducing the demand for public sector ac-
countability (Corrigan 2014), again leading to corruption, poor governance, and conflict 
(Ite 2007). In particular, according to the Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE), an es-
timated USD 9.1 billion per year is lost to oil thieves, while there are also accounts of 
large sums of money being transferred abroad (Nwajiaku-Dahou 2012). 
Nigeria has historically only contributed minimally to global GHG emissions. In per cap-
ita terms, the country’s emissions in 2011 were 0.5 metric tons compared to 6.7 metric 
tons per capita in China. As with other developing countries, Nigeria is vulnerable to 
climate change risks and impacts, as experienced by the high rates of desertification in 
the North and increasing flooding, sea level rise, and storm surges in the Niger Delta re-
gion (Odjugo 2010). Nigeria is also projected to encounter a loss in GDP of between 6% 
and 30% by 2050 on account of climate change (Odjugo 2010). In response, Nigeria’s 
national climate change policy focuses on building institutional capacity, participating in 
global initiatives, investing in science and technology, promoting research, increasing 
public awareness, and mobilizing communities for climate change adaptation measures.  
Prior to the Paris Agreement, the Nigerian government announced its Intended National-
ly Determined Contributions (INDC), which sought to peak national carbon emissions 
by 2030, reducing overall carbon intensity by 50% of 2005 levels, and realizing 30% en-
ergy efficiency. In practice, however, Nigeria continues to experience a lack of domestic 
energy security, which prevents the country from pursuing a low carbon future or proac-
tively adapting to projected climate change impacts. Despite the political rhetoric on 
economic diversification over the past thirty years, Nigeria has yet to implement many of 
these policy directives. 
2.6 The Case of Kenya 
Despite Kenya’s  recent move from least developed country status to a middle income 
country, the country continues to experience high income inequality – with a Gini coef-
ficient of 47.68 (UNDP 2014) – and a high proportion of the population (43%) living be-
low poverty line (below USD 1.25 per day) (UNDP 2014). Kenya is extremely vulnera-
ble to climate change impacts, especially droughts and floods that lead to food insecurity 
(Government of Kenya 2007; 2008). Furthermore, Kenya’s economy is highly dependent 
on climate sensitive sectors such as tourism, agriculture, and forestry (Government of 
Kenya 2007; 2008). 
Significant oil reserves were discovered around the South Lokichar Basin in the north-
west of Kenya in 2012. Although oil production has yet to commence (as of 2015), the 
Kenyan government is already actively pursuing policies to manage it. Most in Kenya 
celebrate the discovery of oil, and argue that the resource will be a driver of prosperity 
while also supplying necessary capital for industrial and infrastructural development 
(Patey 2014). New sources of oil will also help alleviate existing energy supply con-
straints and empower communities in the region by providing employment, trade, and 
commercial opportunities. Furthermore, the government argues that new sources of re-
source wealth will improve the country’s overall energy security and help transform the 
country into a newly industrializing middle-income country with a high quality life for 
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all (Government of Kenya 2007).To achieve these development objectives, Kenya’s Na-
tional Climate Change Action Plan and the National Climate Change Response Strategy 
both call for the adoption of a ‘low carbon climate resilient development pathway’ 
(Government of Kenya 2010; 2013).  
Kenya’s current solar, wind, and geothermal energy potential remains largely untapped 
due to inadequate domestic expertise and lack of investment funding (Awuor & Ouya 
2014; Government of Kenya 2013). At the same time, the issue of stranded resources 
and assets is not perceived as a real risk (cf. Nigeria) as policymakers argue that Kenya 
should be entitled to use newfound oil resources for development purposes.  
Historically, Kenya has contributed approximately only 0.1% of the total global emis-
sions, which are largely attributed to land use change and forestry. Despite its negligible 
responsibility for causing climate change, Kenya’s Intended Nationally Determined Con-
tribution (INDC) pledges to cut the country’s GHG emissions by 30% by 2030. Howev-
er, since over USD 40 billion is needed to realize Kenya’s mitigation and adaptation con-
tribution, the implementation of many of these targets relies on international capital, 
technology, and capacity support (Government of Kenya 2013). 
Whether prospective oil resources will foster equitable and sustainable development in 
Kenya remains questionable. Notable governance constraints include a general lack of 
public sector transparency and accountability, ineffective participation and consultation 
processes, and low institutional capacity to safeguard the environment. Furthermore, 
Kenya could face the resource curse as the newly established oil industry may capture 
the economy, leading to the displacement of other modes of economic development 
(such as tourism, horticulture, coffee, and tea production). Without an adequate revenue 
management vision, corrupt behaviors that permeate throughout other sectors may spill 
over into the oil sector (cf. Bos & Gupta 2016).  
2.7 Inferences 
The above sections argued that understanding the context of the development challenge 
is key to evaluating the opportunities in development, especially in terms of sustaining 
our biodiversity and ecosystem services to such an extent that we can actually continue 
to enjoy and share our wellbeing. All three countries hope to adopt a more-or-less linear 
growth path to ensure more material wealth, but this is in conflict with the Paris Agree-
ment. Though the Paris Agreement only applies to China as Kenya and Nigeria have yet 
to ratify it (as of October 2016), it is only a question of time before they will. Under the 
circumstances, Kenya and Nigeria must avoid long term lock-in of oil and gas produc-
tion, as well as prevent an economy and infrastructure that is dependent on oil and gas or 
dependent in financial terms as illustrated by the resource curse argument. So it is in the 
interest of developing countries to avoid runaway climate change as they will likely face 
long-term negative economic, social, and ecological consequences. Furthermore, under 
the SDGs, it is also vital that these countries maintain their ‘free’ ecosystem services as 
society at-large is dependent on these services for livelihood and economic wellbeing. 
Figure 2 illustrates the potential different routes to sustainable and inclusive develop-
ment for China, Nigeria, and Kenya.  
 
Figure 2. Unique routes to sustainable development 
Insert figure 2 here 
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3. Stranded resources and assets and the developing countries: 
Risks 
3.1 Introduction 
As developing countries are likely to be legally bound by the Paris Agreement in the 
near future, there are a number of reasons why they should refrain from investing in fos-
sil fuels. This section looks at the possible risks of a business-as-usual development tra-
jectory by building on the literature on stranded resources and assets. Then it discusses 
possible geo-ecological risks and how these may play out for our case study countries.  
3.2 Stranded resources and assets, obsolete technologies 
The literature on stranded resources and assets focuses primarily on financial (e.g. con-
tracts) or physical (e.g. infrastructure) stranded assets that may lose their economic value 
because they become obsolete before the end of their expected life (Crew & Kleindorfer 
1999). This generally happens because of changes in innovation (Caldecott & McDaniels 
2014), social values/conditions (Robins 2014), environmental problems (Ansar et al. 
2013), or war/political sanctions which lead directly to changes in consumer preferences 
in the market or indirectly as a consequence of changes in the legislative or policy envi-
ronment (Generation Foundation 2013; Robins 2014; Ansar et al. 2013; Caldecott & 
McDaniels 2014). At the national level, this occurs in regulated sectors such as the elec-
tricity supply sector, including natural gas and nuclear plants. Thus, for example, a fossil 
fuel thermal plant that has to be closed down for environmental reasons is a stranded as-
set. At the international level, this could be because of currency devaluations, political 
sanctions, trade restrictions, or international treaties (Crew & Kleindorfer 1999). Chinese 
oil investment contracts in Iraq could not be followed through because of political sanc-
tions are also an example of a stranded asset. This means that apart from the physical in-
frastructure that becomes a ‘white elephant’, the costs invested in the physical infrastruc-
ture can also no longer be recovered as the ‘book value’ is in excess of the ‘market val-
ue’.  
The literature does not define stranded resources. Such resources are key challenges for 
developing countries that are late to development and have not yet used all the resources 
within their countries so far. One could define a stranded resource as one that cannot be 
extracted and used because of geographical reasons (too far from market, too deep, etc.), 
infrastructural reasons (too difficult to transfer), or economic reasons (too expensive to 
mine or commercial non-viability) because such use may lead to major shocks to biodi-
versity and the ecosystem (Roberts 2008; Khalilpour & Karimi 2011), and this leads to 
either changes in consumer behavior or changes in policy or law, which further leads to 
the resource not being used. For example, forests in developing countries are increasing-
ly being protected – this means that these countries are being encouraged not to deforest 
their lands. As a consequence, these countries forego certain development options, such 
as using = forestlands for biofuel production or for expanding cities. Furthermore, devel-
oping countries have faced geographical, capital, infrastructural, and technological limits 
that have constrained their use of certain resources such as natural gas (Khalilpour & 
Karimi 2011) and even renewables (Leighty & Holbrook 2012).  
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In general, a resource is converted into an asset that is then expected to contribute to na-
tional growth. In the era of neoliberal capitalism, as Figure 3 illustrates, there are no per-
ceived limits to resources, assets, and growth. But in the era of the Anthropocene, this 
can lead to major damages to the ecosystems that provide these very resources (Crutzen 
2006), which can then affect our assets and the growth rate. This may also lead to 
stranded assets that will reduce growth as well as stranded resources that may be per-
ceived as potentially reducing growth. We argue in Figure 3 that the modes of continu-
ously converting all resources into assets are unsustainable approaches.  
 
Figure 3 An unsustainable model of converting resources into assets 
Insert figure 3 here 
 
3.3 Potential geo-ecological risks 
Although developing countries may argue that stranding a resource may lead to a poten-
tial loss of economic growth (Bos & Gupta 2016), this section argues that while there are 
short-term opportunity costs of stranding a resources, there are also long-term significant 
geo-ecological risks of converting these resources into assets. As an example, we take 
the case of investments in the fossil fuel sector in China, Nigeria, and Kenya.  
The Paris Agreement (2015) requires all countries to eventually phase out the use of fos-
sil fuels – earlier rather than later – if they are to stay below the 1.5-2°C limit. This am-
bition is also embedded within the overall Sustainable Development Goals (2015), which 
aim to stay within broader ecosystem boundaries by 2030. This implies that fossil fuel 
technologies are destined to become obsolete within this century (Carbon Tracker 2013). 
Backcasting from the future, the question is whether it is worthwhile for developing 
countries to invest in this technology if they are required to phase it out before the end of 
its ‘useful life’? This may serve the interests of those industrialized countries and com-
panies that actually want to sell this resource and its related technologies to others, but 
may not actually serve the interests of developing countries.  
This question becomes all the more pertinent as some developing countries, including 
Uganda, Ghana and Kenya, have now discovered oil resources. Others – such as Mexico, 
Brazil, Argentina, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, South Africa, China, India, and Indonesia 
– find that there may be opportunities for fracking in their countries. Still others find that 
they are suddenly able to buy up oil and gas resources in other parts of the world (e.g. 
China). Furthermore, some have domestic coal reserves (e.g. China) while some are im-
porting coal from Australia (e.g. India). These countries seem to think that they have no 
choice but to continue to invest in fossil fuels. However, even extraction and generation 
processes may have many negative side effects (e.g. fracking or mining). We argue that 
developing countries face a series of geo-ecological risks by engaging in this process 
(see Table 1).  
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Table 1 Categories of geo-ecological risks experienced by developing countries in the 
context of climate change 
Type Risk Explanation 
Ecological 
Risks 
Risks of climate change 
impacts 
Risks of exposure to climate impacts, such as sea level 
rise, melting glaciers, extreme heat, water scarcity, ex-
treme events, etc. 
Pollution impacts on lo-
cal ecosystems 
Implications of chemical or industrial pollution on eco-
system health and function 
Loss of ecosystem ser-
vices  
Destruction of valuable ecosystem functions, such as the 
destruction of mangroves, groundwater recharge, etc. 
Risk of phase out policy Risks associated with the implementation of the Paris Agreement to phase out fossil fuel extraction and usage 
Social 
Risks  
Human health risks Impacts on human health through vector-borne or non-communicable diseases. 
Livelihood and employ-
ment risks 
Loss of access to social protection and welfare opportu-
nities such as social networks, livelihoods opportunities, 
etc.  
Civil violence risks Impacts of civil conflict or communal violence 
Economic 
Risks 
Loss of state financial re-
sources Risks of prematurely writing-off investments  
Loss of employment op-
portunities 
Loss of access to income generation or wealth creation 
opportunities 
Risk of lock-in Loss of revenue due to the inability to alter dominant en-ergy systems 
Loss of shareholder val-
ue 
Loss of income due to the carbon ‘bubble’ or because of 
loss of oil and gas demanding markets 
Risk of divestment Risk of institutions getting rid of their existing financial investments 
Risk of not receiving aid 
for adaptation 
Loss of access to bilateral or multilateral support for ad-
aptation, risk reduction, or resilience-building activities  
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Indirect social, ecologi-
cal, and institutional 
costs 
Loss of general investment opportunities, ecosystem ser-
vices, livelihood strategies, etc. 
Institution-
al/Legal 
Risks 
Risks of litigation and 
compensation  
When the public demands that the state takes action (e.g. 
Urgenda case in the Netherlands) 
Policy freezing and in-
ternational litigation 
The threat of freezing national policy in order not to be 
sued by foreign investors in the host country under bilat-
eral/multilateral investment treaties 
Compensation to interna-
tional companies  
Risk of having to financially compensate companies who 
no longer are able to invest due to changes in policy or 
institutional context 
Political 
Risks 
Risks of nationalization 
of industries 
Risk of other nations taking ownership over (state) com-
panies operating abroad 
Risks of war Impacts of trans-boundary war, civil conflict, or vio-lence. 
Risks to sovereignty Risk of loss of a country’s ability to govern and enforce laws 
International sanctions 
and other geopolitical 
risks 
Risk of sanctions, limits, and quotas imposed by the in-
ternational community 
 
3.4 Application to China, Kenya, and Nigeria 
The right to development of developing countries is restricted since fossil fuel use must 
be eventually completely eliminated, and since this right has been reframed as the right 
to, and duty to, promote sustainable development. Furthermore, this right to development 
is only valid if oil revenues are made available to governments (i.e. there are limited tax 
holidays or tax evasion and avoidance is low), if governments are subsequently able and 
willing to diversify (i.e. promote affordable renewable sources, ensure energy access, re-
distribute the revenues to invest in other sectors, or avoid corruption), and if national 
economies are advanced according to equitable and inclusive principles.  
On the contrary, the example of Nigeria highlights how oil revenues have led to both the 
resource curse and exclusive dependence on oil and gas revenues, which have led to an 
inability to meet domestic energy demands, promoted corruption, and reduced overall 
development prospects. This undermines Nigeria’s argument for the right to develop-
ment. The example of Kenya shows that despite the discovery of oil resources that can 
spur development, the actual financial benefits to local companies and communities may 
be negligible, unless the state is able to proactively control incoming multinationals and 
is fully aware of the consequences of engaging in agreements given international in-
vestment law. Finally, the example of China shows that some of its foreign investments 
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became stranded assets because of global sanctions or import restrictions in the past, 
which highlight how China does not actually always benefit from access to gas and oil 
abroad. As China’s current investments appear to be more focused on capital gains for 
state companies, the right to development argument may not be quite as legitimate here 
and furthermore – as we argue below – may pose a number of risks.   
In reference to Table 1, if China, Nigeria, and/or Kenya elect to develop their fossil fuel 
resources into fossil fuel assets, they will encounter five broad categories of risks, with 
ecological risks reshaping risks in all other categories. First, ecological risks pertain to 
direct climate change impacts, such as precipitation change, temperature rise, or sea level 
rise. For Nigeria, this includes air and water pollution attributed to extraction activities or 
indirect ecological harm to the economy that further reduces the availability of ecosys-
tem services. Other ecological risks include the imminent restructuring of national econ-
omies as required by the Paris Agreement’s directive on phasing out oil and gas re-
sources.  
Second, social risks refer to impacts on public health, employment opportunities of 
workers in the fossil fuel sector, and potential political resistance leading to civil society 
unrest and the risk of infrastructure sabotage. 
Third, economic risks pertain to losses experienced by the national government attribut-
ed to different social costs (such as labor restructuring, health and security costs, and 
general social unrest), ecological impacts (such as environmental clean-up, costs of 
phase out, and climate change impacts), legal and institutional costs (such as litigation 
and compensation as a result of phasing out oil and gas extraction, or if states are legally 
required to compensate multinational corporations for phasing out fossil fuels). Other 
forms of economic risk include loss of state revenue, loss of economic growth opportuni-
ties, and loss of shareholder value and investment opportunities, all of which can be a re-
sult of production systems being locked into fossil fuel use. Finally, states also run the 
risk of forgoing multilateral assistance for climate adaptation, taking on the liabilities of 
existing assets of oil companies, and even having to pay compensation for possible adap-
tation costs of others. 
Fourth, institutional and legal risks relate the emerging costs of policy freezing or inter-
national litigation, the need to compensate local actors when the state decides to phase-
out, or when states have to compensate transnational corporations for restricting their 
businesses in the future. New investments in fossil fuels may also result in reduced ac-
cess to multilateral climate adaptation funds.  
Finally, political risks include the risk of nationalization or other forms of commercial 
interference by the state, the risk of investing in unstable economics (as exemplified by 
China’s investments in Sudan), the risk of international sanctions that prevent investment 
or lead to the suspension of existing contracts (such as in the case of Chinese invest-
ments in Iraq), and the risk of violent conflict in geo-politically sensitive regions.  
Given these different geo-ecological risks, the assumption that developing countries can 
continue to emit GHGs on account of their low per-capital income in the past only holds 
true as long as the global community – as a collective – can still emit GHGs. However, 
as the Paris Agreement has set a 1.5-2oC target, the opportunities for developing coun-
tries to claim their right to emissions are reducing. Since China, Kenya, and Nigeria have 
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all adopted Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC), they have in turn al-
so committed to a fossil-fuel free future. Furthermore, unlike the short-term impacts of 
political trade-offs, the risks of stranded assets attributed to proactive climate change ac-
tion are likely to be definitive and long-term. The bottom line here is that it may be much 
more expensive to phase out a stranded resource than a stranded asset. As a result, being 
overly confident that industrialized countries will not suddenly demand legally binding 
targets on climate change and will use trade restrictions or sanctions to enforce this is 
unwise (Gupta et al. 2017). Clearly, there is also a risk that the Paris Agreement may not 
be implemented as the US threatens to leave it. An analysis taking into account the polit-
ical risks reveals that investing in renewables is the least risky option (Bos and Gupta 
2017). 
 
4. Towards an alternative inclusive development future 
This section draws some synthetic conclusions and elaborates on further opportunities 
for inclusive development. We argue that Figure 3 is an unsustainable model based on 
the neoliberal capitalist framing of growth, and that when sustainable development – or 
even the green economy and ecological modernization concepts – is addressed through 
this frame, it will lead to trade-offs in favor of short-term economic growth. We argue 
that it cannot lead to trade-offs in long-term economic growth because the resource base 
will be damaged beyond repair or the limits to technological substitution will be reached. 
But of course, some countries or investors may benefit in the short-term at the expense 
of others. We argue instead that all countries must revisit their resource base and analyze 
how much can be converted into an asset in a sustainable manner, such as in the case of 
analyzing maximum sustainable yield of fisheries. This then informs the resource and 
ecosystem base that should be protected as a glocal public good, and as freely accessible 
to all in order to enhance the individual and collective well-being of humans (see Figure 
4). Such a development model implies fewer risks of stranded assets and of being affect-
ed by climate change impacts into the future.  
 
Figure 4 An Inclusive and Sustainable Approach to Resources, Public Goods and Assets  
Insert figure 4 here 
 
As illustrated in Figure 5, the main challenge for countries is deciding what sort of ener-
gy mix to aim for. Many argue that countries must have a broad energy mix in order to 
meet their diverse needs. However, history has shown that past energy demand has not 
increased exponentially as expected as new technologies have promoted more energy ef-
ficient designs. Furthermore, for truly inclusive societies, energy sources must be acces-
sible, affordable, and environmentally sustainable. Countries that select large fossil fuel, 
hydro, and nuclear sources may end up either externalizing the impacts and costs on the 
environment or may lose revenues because these infrastructures have to be written off 
earlier than their intended lifetime (see quadrant 1). If this risk of stranding assets is not 
taken into account – and if environmental externalities are not taxed – such energy 
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sources become affordable for the masses only in the short term (see quadrant 3). Re-
newables can also end up being unaffordable even if they are relatively environmentally 
friendly (see quadrant 2). However, only long-term investments in a diverse portfolio of 
renewable sources – combined with appropriate policy measures – will address both en-
vironmental impacts as well as ensure that such energy is affordable and inclusive of all 
(see quadrant 4).   
 
Figure 5. Energy mixes and inclusive development 
Insert figure 5 here 
 
5. Conclusion 
This conceptual paper set out to evaluate theories of stranded resources, stranded assets, 
and inclusive development to inform how developing countries should ‘develop’ in the 
post-Paris Agreement world. Given that the EU, China and India have ratified this 
agreement, it looks very likely that the world will move rapidly towards a phase out of 
fossil fuels, especially if it needs to meet the 1.5-2oC target.  
We first argued that the old paradigm of developing countries catching up with industri-
alized countries is out-dated. Both developing and industrialized countries have to find 
their own unique pathways to a sustainable future. Mimicking the West’s history with 
energy consumption is unlikely to lead to a (net) zero fossil fuel world. In this context, 
we have argued that Kenya must not emulate the experience of Nigeria since both must 
become net fossil fuel free in the near future. This argument is not just a theoretical one 
based on where societies need to be in terms of GHG emissions, but is also embedded 
within economic reasoning. If the Paris Agreement is premised on a fossil fuel free 
world by the middle or the latter half of this century as the only viable way to reduce 
long-term vulnerability to climate change, this also suggests that societies should not in-
vest in technologies and infrastructures that lock them into GHG-intensive development 
trajectories. For Kenya, investing in new oil extraction and oil-dependent infrastructure 
will leave the country in a major lock-in situation. It will also expose Kenya to the risk 
of stranded assets in the near future, which may prove to be more costly than investing 
wisely now.  
The same is true for China. Since Western countries and companies have already started 
to divest their oil investments, many Chinese companies have rushed into invest in these 
same companies. Though Chinese companies may end up paying the full market price 
today, they will lose out on possible future revenues as their ability to divest will be sig-
nificantly constrained. The risks for newcomers like China and Kenya to invest in fossil 
fuel is considerably higher than early investors like Nigeria, where the natural process of 
capital asset depreciation will lead to an eventual phase-out of oil investments within the 
time limit set forth by the Paris Agreement.  
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